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THE EVOLUTION OF THE HAWAIIAN
JUDICIARY.
TWO PERIODS OF .JUDICIAL HISTORY.
The history of the Hawaiian Judiciary may be conveniently
divided into two periods: The first, which may be briefly
described as the period of absolute government, extending from
the earliest migrations of Hawaiians to these shores, say about
the fifth century of the Christian Era, to the year 1840; the
second, which may be called the period of constitutional govern-
ment, extending from the year 1840 to the present time. Dur-
ing the first of these periods but little progress was made in the
evolution of the judiciary. During the second period, as a result
of peculiar conditions of political, social and industrial change,
and the intermingling of the foreign and aboriginal races, of
widely different but gradually assimilating ideas and needs,
development has been rapid—until now, for independence, for
completeness and simplicity of organization, and for satisfac-
tory administration of justice, the Hawaiian Judiciary occupies
a high place among the judiciaries of the most advanced nations.
FIRST PERIOD TO 1840—NO DISTINCT JUDICIARY.
During the first period the system of government was of a
feudal nature, with the King as lord paramount, the chief as
mesne lord and the common man as tenant paravail—gen-
erally three or four and sometimes six or seven degrees. Each
held land of his immediate superior in return for military and
other services and the payment of taxes or rent. Under this
system all functions of government, executive, legislative and
judicial, were united in the same persons and were exercised
with almost absolute power by each functionary over all under
him, subject only to his own superiors, each function being exer-
cised not consciously as different in kind from the others but
merely, as a portion of the general power possessed by a lord
over his own. There was no distinct judiciary and scarcely
any conception of distinct judicial power, and yet judicial forms
were to some extent observed. Our authentic knowledge of
them is meager and probably does not much antedate the reign
of Kamehameha I.
REDRESS WITHOUT TRIAL.
The usual method of obtaining redress was for injured parties
or their friends to take the law into their own hands and retali-
ate, as for instance in cases of assault or murder. The offender
might, however, escape by fleeing to a city of refuge. In cases
of theft the injured party went to the thief's house and took
whatever he could find—the thief, even though the stronger of
the two, being restrained by public sentiment from offering
resistance. This was not mere unbridled anarchy, though
closely bordering upon it, but was well recognized as a justifi-
able legal proceeding. Even at the present time among the
most civilized nations, similar remedies are allowed, in some
cases by the law as in cases of distraint, recaption, and abate-
ment of nuisance, and in other cases by juries or by common
consent in disregard of the law.
CIVIL TRIALS—COURTS JURISDICTION.
The practice of taking the law into one's own hands, however,
was seldom resorted to in cases in which the wrong-doer was of
higher rank than the injured party, or, if of inferior rank, be-
longed to another chief. In such cases the injured party
appealed for justice to the King or some chief within whose
territory the accused resided. Jurisdiction depended on the
place where the offender was domiciled, or rather upon the lord
to whom he belonged, not upon the place where he was found
or where the offense was committed. Any chief from the im-
mediate lord of the wrong-doer to the King might take cogniz-
ance of the offense and from the decision of any chief an appeal
lay to any one of his superiors. Thus there was a series of
courts, which might be called local, district and national, or,
under Kamehameha, district, island and national, each presided
over by one person whose jurisdiction extended over all persons
domiciled within his territory and was original, and to some
extent concurrent and appellate.
PROCEDURE.
There were no regular police, but the King and each chief
had a number of attendants at hand, whose duty it was with
the aid of their dependents to execute orders and judgments.
Upon complaint being made, the parties were summoned to
appear, generally in the house or front yard of the king or
chief. Judgment was not often rendered until they were both
heard face to face. Witnesses were rarely, if at all, examined.
There was no jury, no prosecuting attorney, no lawyer to exact
fees, raise technical points or create delays. Each party argued
his own cause, often with great eloquence, and usually sitting
cross-legged before the judge. The trial was speedy and the
litigation inexpensive, but then as now not always satisfactory.
Judgment was promptly rendered and as promptly executed.
POWER OF JUDGES—NATURE OF JUDGMENTS.
The personal and official characters of the judge were not dis-
tinguished. He was not bound to act impersonally as the mere
mouthpiece of the law, but might decide according to his own
notions of justice or expediency, and yet as a rule he was con-
strained by public opinion and policy to observe the recognized
law. As to the penalty which he might impose, in respect to
both its nature and amount, he might exercise great discretion,
and might either before or after the commission of the offense
grant the offender immunity from punishment. Much depended
not only upon the character and enormity of the offense but
often also upon the personal disposition of the chief, or the
favor or disfavor in which he held the respective parties, or
upon the intervention of friends who had influence with him.
There was no distinction between public and private wrongs.
The relief granted might be legal or equitable; restorative, com-
pensatory or punitive. In case of theft, restoration of the stolen
property and payment of damages in the nature of a fine was
often adjudged; but if the theft was from a high chief the cul-
prit might be bound hand and foot and set adrift far out at sea
in an old worn out canoe. The remedy for disturbance of a
water right was the restoration of the right. Adultery among
the higher ranks Avas sometimes punished by decapitation.
Banishment to another island was not uncommonly imposed
for various offenses. The penalty for breach of etiquette by a
tenant toward his lord was often extremely severe; the eyes
might be scooped out or the limbs broken, and after several
days of torture the victim might finally be put to death by
burning, strangling, clubbing or in some other way.
RELIGIOUS TRIALS ORDEALS.
There were ecclesiastical as well as civil tribunals. The poli-
tical and religious systems being closely interwoven, the juris-
diction of the priests was not confined to breaches of the reli-
gious taboos, but was to some extent concurrent with that of
the chiefs over civil wrongs. The procedure, however, was quite
different. Their trials were by ordeal and were of two kinds,
ordeal by fire and ordeal by water.
One form of the water ordeal was the "wai halulu," or shak-
ing water. A calabash of water was placed before the suspected
person. After a prayer had been offered by a priest, the accused
was required to hold both hands, with fingers spread out,
over the calabash, while the priest closely watched the water.
If it shook, the accused was guilty, otherwise innocent. The
shaking of the water may have been accomplished by sleight of
hand, or perhaps the consciousness of his guilt made the cul-
prit's hands shake sufficiently to produce by reflection or
shadow a tremulous appearance in the water.
Fire-ordeal was often resorted to in cases of theft and was as
follows: The complainant first paid a fee or costs of court,
usually a pig. A fire was then kindled and three kukui* nuts
were broken, one of which was thrown into the fire. While it
was burning a priest uttered a prayer. So with the other nuts,
one after the other. If the thief appeared and made restitu-
*Aleurites moluccana, or Candle-nut.
tion of the stolen property before all the nuts were consumed,
he was dismissed with a heavy fine. Otherwise a proclamation
was made that the theft had been committed and that the thief
was being prayed to death. The thief then generally pined
away and died, overcome by superstitious fears that he was the
object of the wrath of the avenging deity.
It will be noticed that the trial by fire-ordeal might take
place in the absence of the suspected person or even without a
suspicion against any person in particular, the ordeal serving
as both detective and court ; also that both forms of the
Hawaiian ordeal were in a measure based upon reason and jus-
tice. The ascertainment of the truth depended upon, or at
least might have been left to, the operation of the guilty con-
science of the accused, and the presumption was in favor of inno-
cence; while in most forms of ordeal as found among other
races the burden of proof was upon the accused to establish his
innocence and this could be done in theory only through the
miraculous interposition of providence, in practice only by
chance or legerdemain.
NATURE OF LAWS AND LITIGATION.
The extent to which judicial forms were observed, the nature
of the cases, that were likely to arise and the efficiency with
which rights were protected, varied from time to time with the
character of the rulers, the nature of the laws, and the state of
society. The laws, all of them unwritten, were established by
usage, or by the edict of the -King, and proclaimed throughout
the country by heralds. Of these, the taboos, imposed in early
times for religious purposes only, but afterwards also made use
of by the chiefs for political purposes, in order that they might
add to their civil authority the sanction of religion, formed the
largest and most complex as well as most oppressive body of
laws. Next in number but first in importance, came the laws
of real property upon which the whole system of government
was based, including the laws of tenure, water rights, fishing
rights and taxation. Laws relating to personal security were
few but important, the violations of which, considered more as
torts than as crimes, generally took the form of assault and
occasionally of murder. There was little occasion for the law
of contracts; for, estates in real property were created and
transferred by favor rather than by contract; and personal pro-
perty, of which very little was accumulated owing to the
rapacity of the chiefs, was exchanged only by barter, in which
case the bargain was not binding until delivery of the goods and
expression of satisfaction by both parties and then it became
irrevocable. Domestic relations were little regulated by law;
parents might do as they pleased with their children, often giv-
ing them to others or putting them to death; marriage and
divorce rested upon the consent of the parties or their relatives.
KAMEHAMEHA'S REIGN, 1782-1819.
Until the fifteenth century, peace, prosperity and security
appear to have prevailed. The next four centuries were filled
with turmoil, strife and oppression. But during the reign
(1782-1819) of Kamehameha I., who united the group under
one government, peace and security returned; appointments to
office were based on merit rather than favor; the laws both civil
and religious were made more uniform and were rigidly enforced;
the oppression of the petty chiefs or inferior lords was
checked; their power was broken, and that of the central gov-
ernment was strengthened. During that reign occurred the
change from the island to the national system. Previously
there had been one, sometimes more than one, king over each
of the principal islands. But then one lord paramount or king,
and therefore one supreme judicial, as well as executive and
legislative officer, took the place of several. Next under him
were the governors appointed by him over the different islands,
taking the place of the former tenants in capite or perhaps
rather the place of the former island kings, for they had almost
regal powers. Then came the under chiefs appointed by the
several governors, with the approval of the King, over districts
and villages, and also the tax officers, who acted under the gov-
ernors in tax and land matters. Thus there was a change not
only from an island to a national system, but from a complex
to a simple system. The courts, if we may at this stage call
them such, were reduced practically to- three grades; the
national or supreme, presided over by the King ; the island
or superior, presided over by the several governors ; and
the two classes of district or inferior courts, presided over
by the under chiefs and tax officers respectively, whose juris-
diction was concurrent as to territory but different as to sub-
ject matter. The territorial divisions which have remained
substantially unchanged ever since, also become established in
this reign. There were four general divisions presided over by
the governors, the islands of Hawaii and Oahu each constitut-
ing one, and the islands of Maui and Kauai with the adjacent
smaller islands respectively constituting the others; so that now
when we speak of Maui as a judicial division we tacitly include
Molokai, Lanai and Kahoolawe, and likewise Niihau is regarded
as included in Kauai. During this reign also, as a result chiefly
of foreign influences, the religious system was undermined,
and upon the death of Kamehameha in 1819, it fell to pieces.
Thus ended all ecclesiastical jurisdiction, whether over civil or
religious causes. Not, however, civil jurisdiction over religious
matters. This continued to be exercised against the idolatry
which survived the overthrow of the native religion, and also
against Roman Catholicism, beginning in 1830, a few years
after its introduction. It was considered lawful as against the
Catholics until the Edict of Toleration of 1839 and as against
native idolatry until the Declaration of Rights of 1839 and the
Constitution of 1840 which guaranteed religious liberty. The
inferior judges, however, in their ignorance and zeal, occasionally
tried cases of idolatry until as late as the year 1857.
FROM THE DEATH OF KAMEHAMEHA TO THE FIRST CONSTITUTION,
1819-1840.
Kamehameha, in view of the weaknesses of his son and suc-
cessor,* by will established the office of Kuhina Nui, or Premier,
who was to have power co-ordinate with that of the king. These,
the King and Premier, may be said to have then constituted
the Supreme Court, and they acted to some extent with the
*Liholiho, or Kamehameha II.
advice of a council of high chiefs which became established dur-
ing the reign of Kamehameha and afterwards continued to grow
in power until it developed into the House of Nobles. Soon after
Kamehameha's death the seat of government, and therefore we
may perhaps say the seat of the Supreme Court, was removed
from Kailua to Lahaina and Honolulu, these places having
gradually grown in importance through the advent of foreigners.
During the twenty years which succeeded the death of Kameha-
meha, the good forces set in motion by him continued to operate;
Christianity was introduced the year following his death and
schools were established. Under the influences of their new
• religion and learning, the chiefs gradually became more humane
in their views toward their dependents and more observant of
their rights ; the common people grew to learn that they had
rights; a few written laws relating chiefly to assault, murder,
theft, drunkenness, gambling and oppression, were promul-
gated from time to time, beginning with the year 1823 ; the
conception of judicial as distinguished from other functions
became more clearly apprehended; trials were conducted with
greater formality and in capital cases even the jury was intro-
duced without the aid of statute. In 1839, a course of lectures
on the science of government was delivered by the Rev. William
Richards to the chiefs at their request, and in the same year the
Declaration of Rights, aptly called Hawaii's Magna Charta,-
was adopted securing all rights of person and property. The
nation was then ready to enter upon a course of constitutional
government. This was done by the promulgation of the first
constitution, October 8, 1840, with which date our second period
of judicial history begins.
FROM THE FIRST CONSTITUTION TO THE ACT TO ORGANIZE THE
JUDICIARY, 1840-1847—COURTS.
Under this Constitution legislative, executive and judicial
powers were distinguished, but not with great clearness and
they were still conferred upon the same persons. The supreme
judicial power which with other powers had been previously
exercised by the King and Premier, who acted to some extent
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with the advice of the council of chiefs, was now vested in a
Supreme Court consisting of the King, the Premier, and four
other chiefs elected by the representative body.* The island
courts, by usage or custom rather than by the express language
of the Constitution, continued to be held by the Governors.f
The lower courts were, as before, of two kinds, those of the tax
officers and those of the district judges, the number of whom
rested in the discretion of the Governors. In Honolulu there
were at one time five district judges.
Notwithstanding the meagerness of the constitutional provi-
sions relating to the judiciar}7 there was, with .the exception of
the short "Law for the Regulation of Courts" of 1842, scarcely,
any legislation upon this subject until the comprehensive "Act
to Organize the Judiciary Department" of 1847. These seven
years were years of transition, during which under trying cir-
cumstances the judiciary developed into the fairly complete
system set forth in the Act of 1847.
JURIES.
The Act of 1842 related chiefly to juries. These had been in
use for several years and were mentioned incidentally in the
Constitution, but had not yet been regulated by law. The tax
officers and district judges were to sit without a jury, the former
to hear tax and landlord and tenant cases, the latter to hear
other cases in which the fine or damages amounted to less than
one hundred dollars. Cases in which the penalty was death,
banishment or other punishment of magnitude, or in which the
fine or damages amounted to over one hundred dollars were to
be heard with a jury by the Governors' courts or by the
Supreme Court. In practice jury trials were confined to the
Governors' courts.
The jury was to be composed of foreigners if both parties
were foreigners; of natives, if both were natives; half of foreign-
ers and half of natives, if there were a foreigner on one side and
* The king was Kauikeaouli, or Kamehameha III. The Premier was Kekaulu-
ohi(awoman); she died June 7, 1845, and was succeeded by Keoni Ana (John
Young, Jr.) The other judges were Abner Paki, Charles Kanaina, Jona Kapena
and Kaauwai. Kaauwai resigned in Novembej. 1844, and was succeeded by Josua
Kaeo.
t One of these courts was held for a time by a woman, Kekauonohi, Governess
of Kauai.
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a native on the other. The term foreigner (haole) was con-
strued by the courts to include those who were naturalized as
well as aliens. In capital cases unanimity, in other cases
agreement of three-fourths of the jury was required for a ver-
dict. The jury must be not less than twelve in number,
excepting that in cases other than capital, the jury, if foreign,
might be less in number but not less than eight,—this on
account of the small number of foreigners in any one locality.
As a matter of fact either eight or twelve jurors were usually
drawn, but in at least one case,* if correctly reported, the jury
numbered eleven. The Supreme Court, before which the most
important cases might come, and which before had no regular
terms, but now was to sit twice a year, was to sit only at
Honolulu and Lahaina, since these were the only places where a
sufficient number of foreign jurymen were likely to be found
for capital cases. In the Governor's court there were to be no
jury trials in the back country but only at the Governor's
residence. As a further means of obtaining a sufficient number
of foreign jurymen the Governor might call upon captains of
vessels in port at the time of the trial. In one casef tried in
1844 before Governor Young at Lahaina, the whole jury of
twelve consisted of captains of whaling vessels.
In all cases the jury was to be selected by the Hawaiian
authorities except in a criminal case against a Frenchman. In
such case, by the convention forced upon the King by Captain
Laplace, June 17, 1839, the accused was to be tried by a jury
proposed by the French Consul and accepted by the Hawaiian
Government. A similar provision was inserted in the British
Convention of 1844, and in both the French and British
treaties of 1846, notwithstanding the acknowledgment of
Hawaiian independence and capacity for self-government by
those nations in 1843.
Questions of fact were to be decided by the jury; questions of
law by the judge. But this was not clearly understood until
the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Ricord, Cura-
tor vs. Charlton in June, 1845; for questions of law as well as of
*In re Guardianship F. J. Greenway, a non compos, 1844.
tTyron vs. Calkin, Sept. 17,1844.
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fact were generally argued and submitted to the jury. In a
probate case* in 1844 the only material questions left to the
jury were questions of law upon the construction of a will.
LAW CASES.
The laws recognized but little difference between civil and
criminal cases. The native language not admitting of fine dis-
tinctions, but one word, "hewa," was used in the laws to denote
offense, literally "wrong," and this included both torts and
crimes. As a rule therefore civil and criminal actions were
blended, and the judgment, consisting of fine and damages in
one sum, was divided between the Government and the injured
party in certain proportions. Thus, in one casef a person was
found guilty by the lower judges of stealing twenty-one goats
and placing his mark on them. The penalty was fourfold^ or
eighty-four goats, half to go to the Government and half to the
owner. Upon appeal to the Governor and a jury, the latter
having affirmed the judgment of the lower judges and recom-
mended mercy, the Governor remitted the Government's half
and ordered the defendant to deliver the balance to the owner
within thirty days on pain of having execution issued for their
value at fifty cents each. As time went on, however, civil and
criminal actions came to be distinguished more and more,
especially in foreign cases.
CHAMBER CASES.
Chamber cases, in equity, probate, admiralty and bank-
ruptcy, tried by the judge as distinguished from law cases, civil
and criminal, tried by the court, were not recognized by the
laws, but as they arose one after another the Governor assumed
jurisdiction, and, with the assistance of the Attorney General,§
decided them, when between foreigners, in accordance with the
principles of American and English jurisprudence. The King
also on one occasion| as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court
* Estate of Homai, June, 1844
t Rowlinson vs. Sumner, July 20, 1844.
t Following- the mosaic law.
§ John Ricord, appointed March 9,1844.
II In Brinsmade vs. Jarves, April 22, 1846.
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took jurisdiction in chambers, sitting at eight o'clock in the
evening in vacation, and granting a writ of prohibition order-
ing Judge Andrews not to proceed with a jury in a certain case
until he had heard and passed upon a demurrer. The jury was
often used in chamber cases in those days but since then partly
by usage and partly by statute, this has been gradually changed
until now jury trials in such cases are rare and are practically
confined to certain issues in probate and bankruptcy cases, when
appealed to a jury at regular term.
PROCEDURE.
Proceedings in all the courts were somewhat informal. In
the lower courts/ the judges, sitting one or two at a time, acted
as both judge and prosecutor. There was no lawyer in the
kingdom until the arrival of John Ricord in 1844. The judge
would ask what the complaint was, what the defense was, and,
after hearing the oral statements of the parties, would examine
the witnesses, who were sometimes sworn, and finally pro-
nounce judgment. In the Governor's court the complaint was
in writing in the form of an ordinary letter. There were no
other pleadings except the general answer, (which was some-
times made orally) until August, 1845, when after considerable
discussion a special plea was allowed to be filed.* The first
demurrer was allowed in April, 1846.f In July of the same
year extensive rules of pleading and practice were issued by
Judge Andrews.
POWER OF JUDGES.
As to the laws by which the courts were controlled and the
extent to which they themselves possessed legislative power:—
During the years 1840-1842, a number of laws were passed on
a great variety of subjects, some relating to private, some to
public matters, many advisory rather than mandatory, and in
1842 these were published in a small volume of two hundred
pages, known at first as the ''Laws of the Hawaiian Islands,"
later as the "Old Laws," and now as the "Blue Book," from the
* In Brewer & Co. vs. von Pfister, August 19, 1845.
t In Brinsmade vs. Jarves, Supra.
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color of the cover, which is of a bluish green. These laws read
very quaintly when compared with present laws. The penal-
ties attached to offenses were of great variety, such as fines of
money or other property, imprisonment, irons, flogging, confis-
cation, banishment,* and in some cases the punishment was
left to the discretion of the judge both as to kind and amount.
These laws could not be expected to cover all cases that might
arise, and consequently it was provided, in general terms in the
Constitution, that the laws should give redress to every man
injured by another without his own fault and punish all men
who commit wrong against either the kingdom or individuals;
and, more particularly in a law of 1841, that when a case
should arise to which no statute was applicable, the judge
should inflict such punishment as the general principles of the
new system should require, after first reflecting on those prin-
ciples, the nature of the wrong and the punishment that would
have been inflicted under the old system. Thus was continued
considerable legislative power in the judiciary in law cases both
civil and criminal. In chamber cases between foreigners the
Governor generally called in the assistance of the Attorney
General, who usually wrote out an elaborate opinion with mar-
ginal references to authorities and applied the principles to the
case in question. The Governor would then adopt the opinion
as his own and add that future adjudications would be
governed by the same principles and marginal references.
Likewise in law cases between foreigners he would adopt the
instructions of the Attorney General delivered to the jury.
Thus large branches of common law and equity, admiralty and
probate law were adopted by the Governors. The Supreme
Court also felt at liberty to do the same. The King in his
decision granting tbe writ of prohibition above referred to, says,
"I have power to restrain those who are under me when they
go too fast. This was the ancient custom. I often still prac-
tice it for the benefit of my native subjects; and I am informed
out of the books of foreign countries that such power properly
exists in a chief judge over any court under him." In their
decision in the Charlton case, the Supreme Court in granting a
* To the island of Kahoolawe.
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new trial ordered that it should be deferred until the record
should be sent to England for the opinion of jurists there. This
was done and the decision was supported by those jurists. In
his speech to the Legislature in 1846, the King said that he
reserved the right in foreign cases of delicacy or difficulty to
take counsel abroad when he considered it expedient.
FOREIGN .INTERFERNCE. CHANGES IN JUDICIARY.
Under the circumstances the administration of justice during
the seven years under consideration was as good as could
reasonably be expected. Among the natives a sense of security
prevailed such as had been unknown before. The very first
person tried for murder under the new laws was a high chief.*
He was convicted by a jury of twelve chiefs and was hung.
The people felt that rank was no longer a shield from the penal-
ties of crime. Foreigners also were well satisfied as a rule. The
laws and the policy of the courts were well adapted to the inter-
mixture of barbarism and civilization then existing. But there
was a class of foreigners who for many years had done all they
could to embarrass the Government, and who now concentrated
their assaults upon it chiefly through the courts, challenging
their jurisdiction and methods of procedure, and resisting their
process. The principal scene of action was the Governor's court
on Oahu. It was largely owing to some of the cases that came
before this court that Lord George Paulet, upon the representa-
tions of the British Consul, Richard Charlton, made the demands
which brought about the provisional session of the Islands to
Great Britain in 1843, when for more than five months all
jurisdiction over foreigners was taken from the regular courts.
After this the American Commissioner, George Brown, did what
he could to embarrass the court, sometimes appearing as counsel,
and conducting himself in such a way as would render him
liable to punishment for contempt were he not the representative
of a foreign nation. He was so informed by our Government,
and requested to appear no more in court and finally to leave
the country. In connection with these cases, much diplomatic
correspondence was carried on, in which the positions taken by
* Kamanawa, grandfather of King Kalakaua, tried in 1840.
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our Government were generally sustained by the American and
British Governments. These tribulations and this correspond-
ence were of great value in pointing out the need of judges
familiar with the common law and the needs to be provided for
in the Act of 1847. At first, the Governor, Mataio Kekuanaoa,
who was a man of great ability, but necessarily unlearned in
the common law, wrestled alone. Later he sat in foreign cases
with Dr. Judd on one side and John Ricord.on the other. The
latter had been appointed Attorney-General and was to act as
co-ordinate judge when called upon by the Governor. In such
cases he was often obliged to act both as attorney and judge, his
opinion or instructions to the jury, as already mentioned, being
written out and adopted by the Governor as his own. This was
not satisfactory, but for a time, could not be avoided, because
of the scarcity of legal minds then in the country. On Septem-
ber 19, 1845, however, the Governor appointed Lorrin Andrews to
act as his substitute in all foreign cases. Judge Andrews himself
did not have altogether a smooth time. In one case* in which
he rendered judgment against a sea captain for a seaman's
wages, he was defied by the captain to collect the judgment.
Execution was issued against the captain's cargo, and to enforce
this the police and military forces were in boats on their way
out to the vessel which was defended by the captain and crew
with cutlass, harpoons and spades, when the plaintiff to avoid
bloodshed withdrew his claim.f By the Act of 1846 to Organize
the Executive Departments, it was provided that until the pass-
age of the Act of 1847 to Organize the Judiciary Department,
there should be appointed one or more judges to sit at Honolulu
with original jurisdiction in cases involving over one hundred
dollars in value and appellate jurisdiction in all other cases
from all the local courts of the kingdom, and also special police
justices to sit without a jury at Lahaina and Honolulu (the
centers of foreign population and therefore of crime) in cases
involving less than one hundred dollars in value. Accordingly
Lorrin Andrews was appointed, June 24, 1846, as one of such
judges of original and appellate jurisdiction, and afterwards, on
* Hughes vs. Lawrence, October, 1845.
t The owners of the vessel in New Bedford, Mass.. afterwards reproved the
Captain and signified their readiness to satisfy the judgment.
16
December of the same year, W. L. Lee was appointed as
another, the two to act jointly or severally.* Special judges had
been appointed in 1844 on Hawaii and Kauai for foreign cases.
Thus there was provided throughout the kingdom a judiciary
well adapted to the needs of both foreigners and natives.
FROM THE ACT TO ORGANIZE THE JUDICIARY TO THE PRESENT
• TIME, 1847-JUNE, 1894.
We now come to the Act of 1847. The preceding seven years,
as we have seen, were years of rapid growth principally by judi-
cial adaptation to changing conditions; the period since has
been one of slower growth chiefly by statutory adaptation to
changing conditions. This period will be considered as a whole,
although it might well be subdivided as follows: Five years
under the Act of 1847, forty years under the Act of 1852, and a
year and a half under the Act of 1892, each of these acts being
a comprehensive act to re-organize the judiciary, and making
important changes. Numerous other acts of less importance have
been passed from time to time.
The Act of 4847 embodied in statutory form the results of the
experiences of the preceding seven years.
FORMS OF ACTION. PROCEDURE.
Civil and criminal actions at law were clearly distinguished
and chamber matters, in equity, admiralty, probate and bank-
ruptcy, fully recognized. The former were to be heard chiefly
at term by the courts, the latter in vacation by the judges.
Many rules of pleading and practice were prescribed by the
statute. These have since been added to largely by statute,
rules of court, judicial decisions and usage, but no code of pro-
cedure has yet been enacted. There is great need of such a code.
At present we have in general a mixture of common law and
code pleading and practice, somewhat modified by local usages.
* The Hawaiian Reports, of which eight volumes have been published, begin
with the decisions of Judge Lee of the following month, January, 1847.
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JURIES.
All juries, foreign as well as native, were to number twelve
(the foreign population having increased sufficiently) and a
verdict of three-fourths of these was to be sufficient in capital as
well as other cases, a provision which has continued to this day
with excellent results. We have seen that by treaty the French
and British consuls were entitled to select juries for their res-
pective countrymen in criminal cases. To avoid discrimination
this privilege was now extended by statute to consuls of all
nationalities. And although the provision was omitted from
the British Treaty of 1852 and the French Treaty of 1858, it
remained in the statute until 1862, at which date our judi-
ciary became wholly independent of foreign interposition.* The
race and mixed jury system is still kept up and is the only sur-
viving part of our judicial system which distinguishes between
the foreign and native races. It is destined to disappear to be
replaced perhaps by a jury for all cases to be composed of men
familiar with the English language without regard to nation-
ality.
SEPARATION OF EXECUTIVE, LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL FUNCTIONS.
The Act of 1847 expressly provided that the judges should be
entirely independent of the executive department, and that the
King in his executive capacity should not control the decisions
of the judges, but this was understood to mean, not that judi-
cial and executive, to say nothing of legislative functions, should
not be exercised by the same person, but that the functions
themselves when exercised by the same person should be kept
separate and distinct. As to executive and judicial functions,
the tax officers continued to try cases between the Konohikisf
and makaainanasj until 1851; the Governors to try divorce and
separation cases until 1853; the King and Premier to sit in the
Supreme Court, and the King to have power to try impeachments
* The custom which had existed before 1847 and which was embodied in the Act
of that year, that in admiralty cases between foreigners, jurisdiction should not
be taken without the previous written request of the representative of the nation
whose subject was concerned, had been abolished in 1855.
t Land agents of chiefs.
I Tenants, common people.
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of Governors and Ministers until 1852. As to legislative and
judicial functions, the Constitution of 1852 provided not only
that they should be kept distinct but that they should not be
united in any one individual or body. The Constitution of 1864
limited this to judges of courts of record, but the Constitution of
1887 provided that no judicial officer should be eligible to the
legislature and no legislator should, during the term for which he
was elected, be appointed to any judicial office. Nevertheless
under other provisions of the various constitutions, ever since
1852, the upper house has been a court of impeachment (as the
lower house had been before in certain cases) and each house a
court to pass upon the qualifications of its own members. The
' power to try impeachments may perhaps as well remain where
it is.* But the power to try election cases and to pass upon the
qualifications of members of the legislature should be turned
wholly over to the courts. This was partially done in 1890 by
giving to the courts such jurisdiction when the legislature was
not in session.f
POWER OF JUDGES.
As to the discretionary power of the courts and judges, we
have seen that under the old laws in both civil and criminal
cases, they possessed much power. This ceased in criminal
matters in 1850 when a penal code was enacted which was
intended to be complete and to leave no act criminal or punish-
able at the discretion of the judges, since which time penal
offenses have been wholly of statutory origin. While referring
to this code, we may add that the penalties were limited almost
entirely to fines and imprisonment, showing the marked pro-
gress in sentiment during the preceding ten years ; whipping
was kept until 1872 as an alternative punishment for larceny
of the fourth degree, except that it might not be inflicted upon
females. As to civil matters, the Act of 1847, provided that
the decisions of two-thirds of the judges of the Supreme Court
should be absolute law, as binding as if passed by the Legisla-
ture, and also that any of the courts might adopt the reasonings
* No case of impeachment has ever been tried in this country.
t Such jurisdiction has since been turned wholly over to the courts by the Con-
stitution of July 4, 1894.
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and analogies of the common law and of the civil law. when
deemed founded in justice and not in conflict with the laws and
usages of this country. This was repealed in the Civil Code of
1859 and in its place it was provided that in civil matters the
judges should apply necessary remedies to evils not specifically
contemplated by lawr, conserving the cause of morals and good
conscience, and appealing to natural law and reason or to
received usage and the laws and usages of other countries ; also
that they might adopt the reasonings and principles of the
admiralty, maritime and common law of other countries and
also of the Roman or civil law so far as founded in justice and
not in conflict with the laws and customs of this country.
Under the authority of these acts the courts generally followed
the common law, when applicable, departing from it in not a
dozen cases in forty-five'years and then only when it had grown
obsolete or had been repealed by statute in most other common
law countries. Finally in 1892 it was provided by statute that
in civil matters the common law, as ascertained by English and
American decisions, should be the common law of these Islands
except as otherwise established by Hawaiian law, judicial pre-
cedent or national usage. Thus ended as far as possible the
legislative power of the courts. We may notice here that the
adoption of the common law by our courts ever since they began
to adopt any foreign law is significant of the early and con-
tinued predominance here of the Anglo-Saxon civilization as
distinguished from that of Continental-European nations who
have for the most part followed the Roman law.
POLICE AND DISTRICT COURTS.
As to the organization of the courts:—The lower courts under
the Act of 1847 remained but little changed. There were to be
District Justices not over three for each district. The number
was limited to two in 1852 and left unlimited in 1892. In fact
only one is usually appointed except in a few of the more im-
portant districts—where two are appointed. Two of the Dis-
trict Justices, one at Honolulu and one at Lahaina, were as be-
fore to be Police Justices. All were to have jurisdiction with
certain exceptions, over cases in which the fine or damages did
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not exceed one hundred dollars. In other criminal cases they
might arrest, examine and commit for trial in the higher
courts.*
A Police Justice differed from a mere District Justice chiefly
in these respects ; he had jurisdiction over cases arising on the
high seas as well as over those arising in his district; when
there were both a Police and a District Justice in one district,
the latter had no jurisdiction over foreigners ; and for the pur-
poses of arrest, examination and commitment in criminal mat-
ters the former had jurisdiction over the entire island or circuit
in which his district was situated. The jurisdiction, both civil
and criminal, of the lower courts has been frequently enlarged
and restricted. Their criminal jurisdiction at present extends
to all misdemeanors and some other offenses. Their civil juris-
diction was enlarged to include cases involving values up to two
hundred dollars in 1868, and further up to three hundred dollars
in 1890. In 1892 it was made exclusive up to fifty dollars
and concurrent with that of the Circuit Courts, from fifty up to
three hundred dollars. But no case of libel, slander, malicious
prosecution, false imprisonment, breach of promise of marriage,
or seduction, nor any case which involves title to real estate or
which must be tried by jury, can be tried in the lower courts.
The number of districts has been increased from twenty-four to
thirty and now reduced to twenty-nine. The number of Dis-
trict Justices who were to be Police Justices was also increased
from time to time until finally in 1892, all were made District
Magistrates with the powers previously exercised by Police Jus-
tices, thus marking the growing importance of the outer dis-
tricts. In 1893 the criminal jurisdiction of the Magistrates in
the eight most important districts was made co-extensive with
the respective circuits of which their districts formed a part.
THE SUPREME COURT.
The Supreme Court, consisting of King, Premier and four
chiefs, was stripped of most of its power by the Act of 1847 and
abolished in 1852, its name being transferred to what had since
1847 been known as the Superior Court of Law and Equity, but
*The grand jury has never existed in these islands,
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which was in reality if not in name already the Supreme Court.
Both these courts sat only at Honolulu, Lahaina having fallen
out of the race for supremacy.
This Superior Court of Law and Equity was the outgrowth
of the court of original and appellate jurisdiction already estab-
lished, consisting of Judges Lee and Andrews. It was now to
consist of a Chief Justice (Lee) and two associate Justices
(Andrews and John li), with appellate jurisdiction in the
less important cases from the lower courts and original juris-
diction in most other cases. The court held four terms a year,
the three judges sitting together even in jury cases. When this
became the Supreme Court in 1852, any one of the Justices
might hold the court, subject to exceptions to the c<.urt in banco.
They continued to sit together however until 1869 when, with-
out further statutory authority, the practice was given up on
•account of its inconvenience. They sat singly in chambers,
subject to appeal to the court in banco, but their respective
powers were not the same, those of the Chief Justice being
greater than those of the others, and those of the first associate
than those of the second. They also went singly to the differ-
ent circuits to hold court with the Circuit Judges. There was
great lack of men learned in the law available as judges. Hence
the distinction between the powers of the several justices, and
the necessity of their going circuit, and of their sitting together
on appeals from their own individual decisions—in order that
the available talent might be made to go as far as possible.
The brunt of the work fell upon Chief Justice Lee, a man of rare
qualities and abilities honored and respected by all. But as
the supply of suitable men available as judges gradually in-
creased, and as growing business demanded, and growing wealth
could afford it, greater judicial powers were conferred upon the
associate justices until now there remains no distinction in the
strictly judicial powers and duties of the Chief Justice and the
two Associate Justices ; also, in order to lessen the influence
which a justice would have when sitting with the other justices
on appeal from his own decision at chambers, or on exceptions
from his own rulings at the Circuit or Supreme Court, their
number was increased to five (in 1886). The results, however,
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were thought not to justify the expense and the number was
again reduced to three (in 1888). But in 1892 all original
jurisdiction (except as to the issuance of certain writs) was
transferred from the Supreme Court to the Circuit Courts, the
former remaining almost purely an appellate court—on ques-
tions of law from the District and Circuit Courts, on questions
of law and fact from the Circuit Judges in chambers. At the
same time provision was made for supplying the place of a dis-
qualified or absent Justice of the Supreme Court in any parti-
cular case, by a Circuit Judge or a member of the bar.
THE CIRCUIT COURTS.
The Circuit Courts under the Act of 1847 took the place to
some extent of the former Island or Governors' Courts. In each
circuit there were to be two judges, afterwards increased to
three on Mam (1850) and Hawaii (1851) and in all circuits not
to exceed three (1859)* and finally (1892) reduced to one ex-
cept on Oahu where there are two.f Each Circuit Court held
one term a year, (now increased to two on Maui, Kauai and
each of the two Circuits on Hawaii, and four on Oahu) and was
to consist of a Justice of the Superior Court (Supreme Court
after 1852) sitting with one or more Circuit Judges.J Now
that the Supreme Court is only an appellate court the Circuit
Judges sit alone. The Circuit Courts had appellate jurisdic-
tion in cases appealed from the lower courts and original
jurisdiction in most other cases. The Circuit Judges in cham-
bers had appellate jurisdiction from the lower courts in native
cases, and some original jurisdiction except in foreign cases at
Honolulu.
The criminal jurisdiction of the Circuit Courts, and the
jurisdiction of the Circuit Judges for the purposes of arrest,
examination and commitment has now (1894) been made
co-extensive with the group, instead of being confined as before
to the respective circuits.
* Under the Act of 1859, Maui and Kauai each had only one Circuit Judge after
1860, Oahu two until 1862 and then only one, Hawaii three for several years and
then only two.
f Hawaii was divided into two circuits in 1892 but with only one Judg-e over
both.
I After 1859 a Justice of the Supreme Court might sit alone in case of the
inability of a Circuit Judge to be present.
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CIRCUIT COURT ON OAHU.
On Oahu the Circuit Court and office of Circuit Judge were
abolished because of their uselessness and needless expense, so
long as the Supreme Court and its Justices had original juris-
diction on this island. This was done gradually however. In
1859 all the original chamber jurisdiction of the Circuit Judge
was transferred to the Justices of the Supreme Court, and in
1864 all jurisdiction of the Circuit Court, as distinguished from
the Circuit Judge, was likewise transferred to the Supreme
Court, thus leaving to the Circuit Judge only appellate juris-
diction in chambers. While so sitting his court was known
as the Intermediary Court, that is, intermediary between the
District Courts and the Supreme Court. This jurisdiction also
was finally in 1874 transferred to the Justices of the Supreme
Court sitting singly in chambers. The Court thus held by a
Justice was also called the Intermediary Court, though without
authority of law. To hear such appeals a Justice was required
to make the circuit of the island four times a year, but in 1876
this was made optional with the Justices, to obviate the neces-
sity of going when there were no cases to be heard. In 1892
when the Supreme Court became only an appellate court the
Circuit Court of Oahu was re-established.
SPECIAL COURT OF PROBATE AND DIVORCE.
Before leaving our subject we should touch upon two special
courts which have been established owing to special circumstan-
ces, though with jurisdiction in cases which are ordinarily heard
by the regular courts. In 1853 an increase in the number of
grounds for divorce allowed by statute caused a large increase
in divorce cases, amounting to nearly four hundred a year.
The small-pox epidemic of the same year caused a large increase
of probate cases. Consequently, the next year a special court
was established with jurisdiction concurrent with that of the
Justices of the Supreme Court in probate and divorce cases in
which the decedent or the libellant was a native Hawaiian.*
This court was abolished in 1859.
* The Judge <of Probate and Divorce was Lorrin Andrews, appointed December
28, 1854, he having resigned from the Supreme Court for that purpose.
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COMMISSIONER OF PRIVATE WAYS AND WATER RIGHTS.
After land claims' were settled and their boundaries fixed by
the Board of Commissioners to Quiet Land Titles, many holders
of kuleanas* found their lands entirely surrounded by the lands
of others who denied them the rights of way which they must of
necessity have. To provide for the settlement of such cases, a
court known as that of the Commissionerf of Private Ways was
established for each district in 1856. To this was added in 1860
jurisdiction over cases relating to Water Rights. This court
should now be abolished and its jurisdiction transferred to the
regular courts, not only to add to the simplicity of the system
and to save expense, but also to secure better service.
BRIEF SUMMARY.
Oar Judiciary as it now exists may be briefly described as
consisting of one Supreme Court, five Circuit and twenty-nine
District Courts. The District Courts hear the less important
law cases civil and criminal; the Circuit Courts hear at regular
terms such cases on appeal and other law cases originally, sitting
with a jury in criminal cases, without a jury in divorce cases,
and with or without a jury according to the agreement of the
parties in other civil cases; the Circuit Judges hear equity,
admiralty, probate and bankruptcy cases at any time in cham-
bers ; the Supreme Court at regular term hears appeal cases, on
points of law from the District and Circuit Courts, on points of
both law and fact from the Circuit Judges.
The limits of this paper forbid the consideration of our subject
in greater detail, or the treatment of many other interesting
matters closely connected with it, such as attorneys, clerks,
interpreters, stenographers and law libraries of the courts, the
police and prison systems, the pardoning power, special courts
with jurisdiction not usually conferred on ordinary courts such
as that of the Board of Commissioners to Quiet Land Titles, the
qualifications required for judges, the character, ability, nation-
ality of and special services rendered by the various judges,
* Small land claim in another's land.
t The number of Commissioners was increased to three for each district in 1859,
but reduced to one again in 1888. The present Commissioner for Honolulu is Mrs.
Emma Nakuina.
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their salaries, tenures of office, modes of appointment and
removal, the classes of cases, civil and criminal, that have been
tried from time to time, the nationality of criminals and liti-
gants, and many other matters which would throw much light
on the subject already treated as well as upon the general racial,
political, social and industrial history of the country.
In this brief paper an attempt has been made to trace out only
the general lines of development of the ordinary courts showing
their development; first, in independence of the early religious
system, of foreign interference, and of the other departments of
government; and secondly, in simplicity and completeness of
organization and the separation and clear definition of the differ-
ent functions of the various courts, judges and jury. The funda-
mental causes of this development have been the introduction of
foreign peoples, ideas and customs, the gradual civilization of
the native race, and the general political, social and industrial
growth of the country. This development has been gradual and
has been the result of natural causes, the system by degrees
having been adapted to the changing conditions.



